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The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision on Citizens United vs. Federal Election 
Commission (CU) in January 2010 represents the most dramatic change in corporate campaign 
financing since the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. It asserts for the first time that corporations benefit 
from First Amendment protection regarding freedom of speech.1 In practice, the ruling lifts prior 
bans on corporations to use their treasuries to advocate in favor or against a political candidate on 
an election, known as independent expenditures on express advocacy. CU had an immediate and 
profound impact on campaign financing with independent expenditures in presidential cycles 
increasing from $143 million in 2008 before the ruling, to over $1 billion in the 2012 and $1.4 
billion in 2016 after the ruling (Centre for Responsive Politics, 2019). We study the effects on 
corporate political activism that occur with CU. Specifically, we are interested in exploring how 
the CU ruling, and the new ability to engage in political activism through independent expenditures 
affect the value of existing forms of corporate political activism. 
Issacharoff and Karlan (1999) hypothesize that campaign finance money is like a hydraulic 
system. This hypothesis implies a substitution or crowding-out effect where political money “never 
really disappears into thin air” (p. 1708), rather it “has to go somewhere” as regulation opens up 
new doors. On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that “interest groups who engage in 
PAC [(political action committees)] contributions do not lobby and that most interest groups who 
lobby do not engage in PAC contributions” (Lake, 2015, p. 87). This evidence paints a view of 
segmentation on the various forms of political influence. The goal of this paper is to provide 
evidence on this debate by answering the quest set by Issacharoff and Karlan that “understanding 
                                                          
1 Citizens United, Appellant vs. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. (docket nos. 08-205) decided 1/21/2010. 
Werner (2011) provides an overview of the antecedents of CU and of the ruling itself.  
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why [political money] flows where it does and what functions it serves when it gets there requires 
thinking about the system as a whole” (p. 1708). 
As connections, lobbying as well as PAC and executive contributions all serve the same 
purpose, though with different focus and efficacy. One might expect that firms engage in several 
of these at the same time (e.g., Akey, 2015, Ansolabehere et al., 2002, Austen-Smith, 1995, 
Briffault, 2008, Lake, 2015, and Wright, 1996). However, observing that firms engage in more 
than one type of political activism says little about the complementarity, substitutability, or 
segmentation across these inputs, just as the degree of input substitutability in a production 
function cannot be ascertained simply by observing that firms use both labor and capital.  
We use CU as an exogenous identification shock to substitutability as the Supreme Court 
decision was largely unanticipated (it was also a close 5-4 decision). We study the announcement 
returns to firms that are politically active before CU. We identify firms that are politically active 
by using data on political connections (by the firm’s top executives, board members and senior 
managers), lobbying expenditures, and contributions by both PAC and top executives. Our event 
study is akin to a difference-in-differences design: the left-hand-side variable is the change in price 
from before the CU decision to after the CU decision (i.e., the cumulative abnormal return) and 
the right-hand-side variable of interest is the pre-event level of activism, which is a continuous 
treatment variable that exploits cross-sectional variation (see Duflo, 2001; Florens et al., 2008).  
We find that stock market returns at the announcement are negatively associated with the level 
of political connections in a firm, but do not observe any effect on firms that engage in other 
dimensions of political activism, such as lobbying, PAC, or executive contributions. The negative 
announcement return implies a loss in value of one political connection of $6.9 million for a firm 
with average market capitalization. We attribute the decline in the value of political connections 
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to a crowding-out effect from independent political spending. We do not interpret this evidence as 
saying that political connections are no longer valuable to corporations (Goldman, Rocholl, and 
So, 2009, Fisman, 2001, and Faccio, 2006, provide evidence on the value of political connections). 
Instead, some of the value of political connections appears to be subsumed by the existence of a 
new form of political activism.  
The crowding-out hypothesis predicts that the observed market reaction is accompanied by 
changes in political activism after CU, as firms substitute away from less valuable forms of 
political activism. We regress the level of activism on a dummy variable that describes pre- and 
post-CU decision periods. However, without another source of heterogeneity across firms, we 
cannot adequately control for time-series changes in connections caused by unobserved concurrent 
events, and therefore, endogeneity issues are potentially severe. We explore the fact that twenty-
three states had state-election bans on independent political expenditures by corporations before 
CU, besides the federal-election ban on independent political spending that affected all states.2 
The decision in CU overrules all bans, including state-election bans, and gives rise to a cross-
sectional difference that allows the identification of the effect of independent political spending 
on corporate political activism based on company-headquarter state. Corporations headquartered 
in ban states form the treatment group, while corporations in no-ban states form the control group 
(see also Spencer and Wood, 2014). This difference-in-differences analysis allows us to control 
for any events, concurrent to CU that may also affect how firms change their political activism. 
One limitation of this analysis is that the treatment effects focus on only state-level dimensions of 
                                                          
2 State bans had been ruled constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990 in Austin vs. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce. Austin, Michigan Secretary of State, et al. vs. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
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political activism. Therefore, we remain cautious in the interpretation of any potential impact of 
CU on national-level aspects of political activism.  
We find that firms have 13.6% fewer state-level political connections after CU if their 
headquarters locate in ban states relative to those firms that locate in no-ban states. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that independent political expenditures crowd out political 
connections after CU. Consistent with not having found any announcement return effect on firms 
that engage in other dimensions of political activism, such as lobbying, state-level PAC, or 
executive contributions, we find no changes in those dimensions before and after CU for states 
with bans versus states without bans on independent spending before CU. We also find no evidence 
that national-level connections responded differently after CU for states with bans and states 
without bans.  
To summarize, we find evidence of crowding out of political connections, but no evidence of 
crowding out along the other dimensions of corporate political activism: lobbying, PAC, and 
executive contributions. There are several potential explanations for why not all forms of political 
activism respond to CU. Lobbying is generally viewed as issue-specific, calling for specific 
legislation or regulation, which may explain less of a crowding-out effect. Briffault (2008) argues 
that the law is less restrictive on lobbying versus PAC contributions as it recognizes a special 
function to the former for both corporations and unions to organize grassroots in helping the 
legislator. Likewise, Bertrand et al. (2014) also argue for a specific role for lobbying.3 PAC 
contributions are not exclusively under the control of management in that unions not only help 
                                                          
3 Some authors find evidence that lobbying is more efficient in some settings than connections. Correia (2014) 
documents that directly lobbying the SEC is more effective than having executives with connections to the SEC in 
reducing enforcement costs faced by firms. Blau et al. (2013) document that lobbying was more efficient in receiving 
money from the Troubled Asset Relief Program than connections. Bertrand et al. (2014) argue that lobbying activities 
are particularly suited as a vehicle to provide issue-specific information to regulators and politicians. 
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fund them but also help direct the funds. Thus, PAC contributions may also experience limited or 
no crowding out. Like independent expenditures, executive contributions are under the control of 
management and promote express or candidate advocacy; executive contributions are therefore 
likely candidates for crowding out. However, the fact that executive contributions have low legal 
limits, do not involve the corporate treasury, and are tied to the manager rather than to the firm, 
may limit crowding out. Similar to independent expenditures, political connections are strictly 
under the control of management and can be used for general influence. These two characteristics 
make political connections a close substitute for independent political spending in the pursuit of 
political activism. 
Next, we examine the heterogeneity of the crowding-out effect on connections based on who 
is the connected agent. We define Executive Connection if the classification of the connected 
individual includes CEO, CFO, or COO. We define Board Connection if the classification of the 
connected individual includes independent director, director, or independent/deputy chairman. We 
define Other Connection if the classification of the connected individual includes senior VP, 
division/regional president, or general manager. Our results indicate that the loss of value in 
connections occurs mostly in the Other Connection category. This evidence is consistent with 
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) who show that political connections via top executives 
appear to be more effective, and therefore less substitutable. 
Finally, we investigate the heterogeneous effects based on industry attributes by examining the 
relationship between political activism and firm value separately for industries with high or low 
reliance on the political sector. We find that regulated industries display a positive and significant 
market reaction to CU, which is consistent with Burns and Jindra (2014). They argue that regulated 
industries have more significant interaction with the government and may benefit more from 
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having more avenues to advance their agendas. In addition to this result, we show that firms with 
high connections in non-regulated industries experience negative announcement returns, whereas 
connections appear not to affect announcement returns in regulated industries. This result is 
consistent with Faccio (2006, 2010) who suggests that firms in the regulated industries are more 
likely to harness the benefits from political and government connections, which become less 
substitutable than connections in non-regulated industries. 
In robustness analysis, we consider the possibility that the announcement returns are driven by 
other information events occurring on the day of the ruling. The main other such event is the 
announcement by President Obama publicly endorsing the Volcker rule. The results are unchanged 
if we exclude financial firms. We also perform placebo tests by repeating our tests with data two 
weeks before and also two weeks after the date when the CU decision is announced. We find no 
statistically significant effect on announcement returns at the placebo dates for firms politically 
active through either connection, lobbying, PAC, or executive contributions. We also include a 
vast array of control variables, including state-level political competition proxies, dependency on 
the government as a top customer, and others. Our results on the crowding-out effect over political 
connections remain.  
Our paper contributes to the evidence on the value of corporate political connections. There is 
an extensive literature documenting that political connections add value to the firm (see Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So, 2009, for evidence in the U.S., and international evidence see Fisman, 2001, 
Faccio, 2006, Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009, Amore and Bennedsen, 2013, and 
Schoenherr, 2019). Many papers have provided evidence on the sources of value from political 
connections including the ability to access outside funding (Khwaja and Mian, 2005, and Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), the likelihood of being bailed out or of facing less enforcement (Faccio, 
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Masulis, and McConnell, 2006, and Correia, 2014), the subsidies gained in the event of financial 
crises (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Kostovetsky, 2015; and Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Kermani, Kwak, and Mitton, 2016) and in obtaining procurement contracts (Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So, 2013). Complementing this literature, we show a crowding-out effect on political 
connections from a new form of political activism. 
Our paper is also related to the work on the effects of CU. We are the first paper to explore the 
impact of CU on the value of political connections, arguably the closest substitute to independent 
political spending. Consistent with our results, Spencer and Wood (2014) find an increase in 
independent expenditures in state elections for states with prior bans on independent political 
spending. Werner (2011), like us, finds no evidence of market reaction to CU for firms with 
lobbying activity and political action committee (PAC) contributions. Werner (2011) also finds no 
evidence of market reaction for firms with procurement contracts. Coates (2012) finds increased 
PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures after CU for politically active, unregulated firms. 
Our difference-in-differences result of no change in PAC contributions (for state-level elections) 
in ban states versus no ban states after CU suggests that the finding in Coates is due to other 
concurrent events that lead to a generalized increase in PAC contributions. Newton and Uysal 
(2013) find an adverse market reaction around the announcement of CU for firms with high levels 
of PAC contributions.  
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on corporate governance. There is a clear sense 
that political activism can be beneficial to shareholders and plenty of evidence shows that 
connections are valuable. However, managers can play the game of political activism for private 
9 
 
benefit (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2012).4 Since the CU ruling, there has been a heated policy debate 
on whether the SEC should issue regulations that require public companies to disclose their 
political expenditure.5 Little is known of CU’s effects on corporate political activism. To our 
knowledge, we are the first paper to show that, in the absence of disclosure requirements, 
independent expenditures can substitute for political connections but not for lobbying or PAC 
contributions. Our findings suggest that the discretion that management may have with 
independent expenditures and political connections does not carry to lobbying or PAC 
contributions. Understanding these differences may help inform the current debate.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the data, and Section III gives 
our main results. Section IV discusses robustness issues and Section V concludes. 
 
II. Data 
We collect data to conduct two main tests. The first is an event study of the cumulative 
abnormal returns around the Supreme Court’s decision for which we need controls measured as of 
2009. The second is a difference-in-differences analysis, and we use data from 2007 to 2012.  
 
A. Corporate Political Activism and Stock Returns Around the Announcement 
                                                          
4 In its proxy voting recommendations on “Political Contributions, Lobbying Reporting & Disclosure,” Institutional 
Shareholder Services (2019, p. 58) writes “While political contributions, lobbying and other corporate political activity 
can benefit the strategic interests of a company, it is important that accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure 
that monies disbursed in support of political objectives actually generate identifiable returns on shareholder wealth.”  
5 In December 2015, Congress adopted a budget agreement that included a provision preventing the SEC from issuing 
a corporate political disclosure rule (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2015). In February 2019, a new bill named as “Corporate 
Political Disclosure Act of 2019” was introduced to Congress. It directs the SEC to issue regulations on political 
spending disclosure, although doubts remain if it can be passed by the Senate (Posner, 2019). In parallel to political 
moves on corporate disclosure, CU appears to have awakened shareholders as well to these issues. Proxy Monitor 
reports that companies in the Fortune 250 saw a 150% increase in relevant shareholder proposals after CU (Copland 
and O’Keefe, 2016), and Cohn et al. (2016) and Westcott (2013) report a jump in shareholder proposals regarding the 
disclosure of political spending. 
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Our sample is based on firms in ExecuComp, which covers 1,830 listed firms in 2009. We 
obtain stock returns from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) files and require that 
ExecuComp firms have available stock return data before and around January 21, 2010. We 
calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) using the market model across several event 
windows, (1, 1), (0, 1), (1, 2) and (1, 3), using the CRSP value-weighted market index as the 
benchmark, where January 21 is day 0.  CAR is expressed in percentage terms. The estimation 
period for the market model ends ten days before the announcement of CU, and we require a 
minimum (maximum) estimation period of 60 (505) days.6 The estimation period requirement 
reduces our sample to 1,748 firms. The accounting variables used as controls in the regressions 
are obtained from Compustat. These variables are winsorized at the levels of 1% and 99%. 
Merging the abnormal return data with the accounting data results in a final sample of 1,722 firms. 
We obtain several measures of corporate political activism. Corporate connections are 
measured using BoardEx. We collect CVs of corporate board members, top executives and senior 
managers from BoardEx, and produce a list of individuals who currently hold or previously have 
held a position in a government organization in the U.S. The number of political connections for 
each firm in any given year (Connection) is the number of executives, board members and senior 
managers of the firm with such positions in that year. To merge BoardEx with ExecuComp, we 
require firms to have valid identifiers such as tickers; when tickers are missing or incorrect from 
BoardEx, we manually match firms using firm names. Out of our sample of 1,722 firms from 
ExecuComp, 1,186 firms have non-zero political connections from BoardEx in 2009. For the 
remaining firms in our sample, we code connections as zero. Connections is a continuous treatment 
                                                          
6 Results (untabulated) are also similar if we use the market-adjusted returns to measure abnormal returns, i.e. raw 
return in excess of the market return. 
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variable that exploits cross-sectional variation in activism (see Duflo, 2001; Florens et al, 2008). 
In a continuous treatment variable, the differential (and continuous) exposure to the treatment is 
what captures unobserved variation from concurrent events. We give the same interpretation to the 
zeros in the other measures of political activism described below. 
Firms have political connections with different levels of government, and we further divide 
connections into national, state, and local using information from the organization’s name. We 
define a government organization as a national one if its name includes any of the following terms: 
“Federal”, “National”, “US”, “President” or “White House”. We define a government 
organization as a state one if “state”, “senate” (in the state legislature) or any name of the 50 states 
in America is included in the organization’s name.7 Finally, we define a government organization 
as a local one if its name contains any of the following words: “City”, “County”, “Village”, “Town” 
or “Corp”. We manually check and categorize government organizations that do not contain any 
of these words. 
Executive contribution data are obtained from individual political contributions data of the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) for ten federal election cycles from 1991 to 2010. The FEC 
gives information on donors’ names, employers, addresses, and sometimes their occupation. We 
match these data with ExecuComp data on names of company executives and their annual 
compensation information for 37,886 executives in 3,241 listed companies over 1991-2010. We 
develop an algorithm to conduct the match and visually check the results. The match is based on 
(i) last name (exact match), (ii) first name (allowing for variations, e.g. Rob vs. Robert), (iii) either 
                                                          
7 If the name of the government organization contains “United States”, it will be mistakenly categorized into the state-
level group under this classification. We then manually check these observations and define them as national. Similarly, 
if the name of the government organization contains “senate”, it could include a senate in congress. To ensure accuracy, 
we also manually classify them as either a national or state government organization.  
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employer names (including employment history) or (3-digit) zip codes. This leads to 269,618 
matched contributions, by 16,747 executives in 3,019 firms from 1991 to 2010. About 82% of 
matched results are based on employer names rather than zip codes.8 We then aggregate individual 
contributions to the firm level for our sample of 1,722 firms. For the event study analysis, we 
measure a firm’s executives’ political contributions in 2009 (Executive Contribution) by 
cumulating all past contributions made before the end of 2009 by current executives independently 
of their previous employment.9 For the difference-in-differences analysis, we use the current value 
of executive contributions for each firm and year from 2007 to 2012. Executive Contribution is set 
to zero for firms whose executives are not in the FEC data. 
Lobbying data are obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics. Lobbying data are 
collected since 1998 for firms that spend more than $20,000 on direct lobbying activities and are 
thus required by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to file with the Senate Office of Public 
Records and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. We match these data to the ExecuComp 
sample by manually checking firm names. Among our sample of 1,722 firms from ExecuComp, 
742 firms have non-zero lobbying expenditures in 2009. We code lobbying as zero for ExecuComp 
firms that never spend money on lobbying. For the event study analysis, we add up all past 
lobbying expenditures made before 2009 for each firm to calculate cumulative prior lobbying 
                                                          
8 As a robustness check for the match, we check the occupation of matched donors. FEC has begun record occupation 
since 2001 and the coverage has improved over time. In 2010, 80% of the matched donors have recorded occupation 
of ‘executive’, ‘director’, ‘CEO’, etc. 
9 We also use another measure to aggregate individual contributions to the firm level. This measure tracks the firm: it 
sums up contributions made by both current and past executives, only if a contribution is made during the tenure as a 
top executive of the firm. We obtain similar results. The results discussed in the paper and not tabulated can be found 




expenditures (Lobbying). In the difference-in-differences analysis, we use each firm’s current 
value of lobbying expenditures for each year from 2007 to 2012. 
Political contributions of firms’ Political Action Committees to state elections are obtained 
from the National Institute on Money in State Politics. We match the contributions data to the 
ExecuComp sample by manually checking firm names. PAC Contribution for each firm in 2009 
is the sum of all past contributions donated before the end of 2009. Out of our sample of 1,722 
firms, 502 firms have non-zero PAC contributions in 2009. We code PAC contribution as zero for 
ExecuComp firms that never spend money on PAC contributions. For the difference-in-differences 
analysis, we use the current value of PAC contributions for each firm and year from 2007 to 2012.  
 
B. Corporate Governance Measures 
Following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), we 
use both G-Index and E-Index as corporate governance measures. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) construct an equally-weighted index based on 24 governance provisions from the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) propose an index 
based on six of these provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, 
poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments and 
mergers. Among our 1,722 firms, 1,429 firms have available data on G-Index and E-Index.  
We use two additional measures of corporate governance. A firm where the CEO is also 
chairman of the board may have fewer mechanisms for supervising management. Hence, we use 
a dummy variable to capture whether a CEO is the Chairman of the Board (CEO Duality). We 
obtain positions of executives from RiskMetrics and manually check whether the CEO held the 
position of chairman of the board as of the end of each year. Further, poor governance may drive 
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CEO entrenchment and lead to excess CEO pay. We follow Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011) 
and measure excess pay (Excesspay) using ExecuComp data as the difference between CEO 
compensation and the median compensation of a set of peer firms in the same industry and of 
similar size as that of the firm. More specifically, Excesspay is calculated as the logarithm of total 
compensation (variable TDC1 from ExecuComp) for the CEO minus the logarithm of the median 
total annual pay for all remaining firms on ExecuComp that are in the same Fama and French 
(1997) 12-industry group and size quintile of the firm for that year. The definitions and data 
sources of the control variables can be found in the appendix. Table 1 shows the summary statistics 
for all variables for the 2009 cross-section of firms. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
III. Empirical Results 
A. Political Activism and Firm Value 
In this section, we examine the effect of Citizens United vs. FEC for firms with different levels 
of political activism. Our main test estimates the stock market response to the announcement of 
the ruling for firms with existing political activism relative to firms with no political activism. This 
event study is akin to a difference-in-differences design where the left-hand-side variable is the 
cumulative abnormal return from before the CU decision to after the CU decision (i.e., the change 
in price) and the right-hand-side variable of interest is the pre-event level of activism. Table 2 
presents regression results on the relationship between political activism and firm cumulative 
abnormal returns around the announcement of CU, after controlling for firm and industry 
characteristics. We measure cumulative returns over different event windows around January 21, 
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2010. Columns (1) through (4) of both Panels A and B display the results for event windows of 
(1, +1), (0, +1), (1, +2), and (1, +3). We add control variables that are suggested in the literature, 
including three-digit SIC industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry. The reason 
to cluster by industry is to account for residual correlation at the industry level. This correlation 
can derive from investors who associate all firms in the same industry (e.g., banking, oil, and 
telecommunications) with similar behavior after CU.10 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Consider first the results in Panel A. We find that Connection is negatively associated with the 
announcement return. The loss of value for firms with connections suggests a reduction in the 
market value of political connections: a marginal political connection lowers firm value by $6.9 
million ($8.3 million) for an average firm, which equals the three-day (five-day) announcement 
return of 0.1% (0.12%) times the sample-average market capitalization of $6.9 billion. This 
evidence is consistent with the crowding-out effect of independent political spending, the newly 
available form of political activism after CU, over political connections.  
Consistent with evidence in Werner (2011), the coefficients on other political variables, 
Lobbying,11 Executive contribution, and PAC Contribution are insignificant, suggesting that they 
are not close substitutes to independent political spending. We discuss in the introduction of the 
                                                          
10 The results are essentially unchanged if standard errors are clustered by state or firm. We also find similar results if 
we add state dummies in the regressions.  
11 We use lobbying spending in 2009 as an alternative variable for lobbying, and use the sum of contributions made 
by both current and past executives—provided the contributions are made during the tenure as a top executive of the 
firm—as an alternative to our measure of executive contributions. The results are similarly insignificant with these 
alternative measures of political activism. 
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paper possible justifications for this non-result. These justifications point to other measures of 
political activism not being directly under the control of management as political connections are, 
or of having characteristics that make them unique such as lobbying. 
In Panel B, we further explore the monotonicity effect of connections by using categorical 
dummy variables. High Connection is a dummy variable that equals one if firms have 6 or more 
political connections in 2009 (equal to or above percentile 90) and zero otherwise. Low Connection 
is a dummy variable that equals one if firms have between one and five political connections in 
2009 and zero otherwise. Firms in the control group are firms without a connection. The results 
show that the effect of connections on the announcement return is monotonic. Only the firms in 
the top decile of connections appear to be significantly affected relative to the omitted group of no 
connections. The estimated coefficients associated with the dummy for five connections or fewer 
are all smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant.12 The loss of value for firms with high 
connections suggests a reduction in the firm value of $62.1 million ($74.5 million) relative to the 
control group, which equals the three-day (five-day) announcement return of -0.90% (-1.08%) 
times the sample-average market capitalization of $6.9 billion. We offer two explanations for the 
finding that our results are concentrated in firms with a high level of connections. First, 
connections may be more salient to analysts and investors if they are pervasive in the company. 
Second, firms that have spent considerable resources developing a large number of connections 
                                                          
12 We also re-estimated the model using 5 connections as a cut-off for the definition of High Connection. Firms with 
5+ connections represent 15 percent of our sample.  The results are qualitatively similar to those discussed above. 
Finally, we re-estimated the model using categorical dummy variables for 1 connection, 2 connections, 3 connection, 
4 connections, 5 connections, and 6+ connections. The results are again qualitatively similar to those discussed above: 
only the dummy with 6+ connections is significant in all specifications (the coefficient associated with the dummy 
with 5 connections is significant at the 10% level when we use the event windows (1, +1) and (1, +2)). 




may have over-invested in this traditional form of political capital, and these firms may have the 
most to lose under the new regime.  
The results in these regressions mimic the simple, average cumulative abnormal returns during 
the event, without including control variables. In the internet appendix, we show that: (i) connected 
firms have a positive CAR, though lower than that of non-connected firms, (ii) it is the firms with 
a high number of connections that have the lowest returns, and (iii) firms with the highest number 
of connections have a negative return. 
Table 3 tests whether the effect we find on connections is a governance effect. We repeat the 
regression in Panel A of Table 2 where the dependent variable is the CAR measured over the 
window (1, +3) but add Excesspay, E-Index, G-Index and CEO Duality respectively in columns 
(1) through (4) as corporate governance control variables. These corporate governance controls do 
not appear to subsume the effect of connections and in fact, do not even affect the market response. 
If anything, the coefficient on Connection becomes larger in absolute value. We also use 
alternative corporate governance variables, such as a founder-CEO dummy, the percentage of 
independent directors in the board of directors, the excess pay measured by Cai and Walking 
(2011), and a co-opted board dummy (that equals one if the firm’s percentage of directors 
appointed by the CEO is among the top quintile of the firm-year observations, and zero otherwise), 
and find similar results. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
While we cluster the standard errors at the industry level in the announcement-return 
regressions, the results are robust to using bootstrapped p-values. Bootstrapped p-values account 
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for the concern that the announcement could result in a cross-sectional correlation of returns across 
stocks and thus bias the OLS standard errors even with the industry clustering (see Sefcik and 
Thompson, 1986, and Bernard, 1987). We use a procedure similar to that of Lo (2003), Zhang 
(2007), and Cai and Walking (2011). The process generates 10,000 repetitions where each 
repetition uses sample firm abnormal returns from 50 randomly-selected non-overlapping 3-day 
windows from non-event periods. This procedure maintains the cross-sectional correlation of firms’ 
returns in the non-event period so that one can assess whether the event returns are statistically 
significant after taking into account any cross-sectional dependence generated by the event. 
 
 
B. Changes in Political Connections after Citizens United 
We next test whether political activism changed after CU using a window from 2007 to 2012. 
We construct the variable Post Dummy that equals one from 2010 to 2012 and zero from 2007 to 
2009. Each of these periods contains two years of a presidential election cycle and one year of a 
mid-term election cycle. If we regress political activism, say Connection, on Post Dummy in the 
absence of a control group, we cannot claim that the effect we find is due to the CU decision 
because unobserved concurrent events could also cause it. To conduct this test, we use the fact that 
twenty-three states had bans on independent expenditures by corporations on state elections before 
CU based on Austin vs. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.13 These bans are overruled by CU. We 
thus use firms in ban states as the treatment group and firms in no-ban states as the control group 
(see also Spencer and Wood, 2014), and define Ban State to equal one if the firm is headquartered 
                                                          
13 Our data is collected from the National Conference of State Legislatures. There were 23 states that prohibited or 




in a state with bans on independent expenditures on state elections and zero otherwise. We expect 
firms in ban states that rely on more traditional forms of political activism before CU to circumvent 
the limitation of using treasury money to fund state-level political campaigns, such as by investing 
in state-level political connections or PAC contributions, to potentially change the way they 
engage in political activism.  
In Table 4, we present the results on changes in firm connections. (We report the effects on the 
other forms of political activism in Table 5, which is to be discussed in the next sub-section.) The 
dependent variable is the number of connections in any given firm and year, which we also break 
down into national, state, and local connections. The independent variables include Ban State and 
Post Dummy, but also the interaction of interest, Ban State*Post Dummy. We use an OLS 
regression model and add lagged firm characteristics that affect the establishment of political 
connections as control variables. We include three-digit SIC industry dummy variables and cluster 
standard errors by state.14 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The variable Ban State*Post Dummy is significantly negatively associated with All 
connections and with State connections. The coefficient on State connections is 0.099, indicating 
that firms have 0.099 fewer state-level political connections after CU if they headquarter in ban 
states relative to those firms that locate in no-ban states. The estimated coefficient corresponds to 
                                                          
14 We find similar results if we include 47 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 48 industries and calculate 
standard errors clustered by firm. Our results are robust also if we use a Poisson regression model. 
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an economically sizable effect as the average state-level connection in our 2007 to 2012 sample is 
0.73 (i.e., a 13.6% decrease).  
The Ban State*Post Dummy interaction has no explanatory power for local-level connections, 
possibly because there is not enough power in the data to detect an effect on local connections. 
While 44% of the firm-year observations in our 2007 to 2012 sample have state connections (with 
an average connection of 0.73), only 9% of the firm-year observations have local connections (with 
an average connection of 0.11). We also do not find any significant effect of Ban State*Post 
Dummy on national-level connections. As explained before, this is consistent with what we 
expected since companies from any state are prohibited from using independent political spending 
on national elections before CU, and there is no cross-sectional variation across states. In summary, 
the evidence from state connections suggests that political connections lose some of their value 
after CU, consistent with the crowding-out effect.  
The difference-in-differences analysis of Table 4 requires that any trends in outcomes for the 
treatment and control groups before treatment are the same (i.e., the “parallel trends” assumption). 
The “parallel trends” assumption holds in our setting as the difference in average growth rates of 
political connections across the treatment and control groups of firms before CU is not statistically 
significant. Also, we check that firms in ban states do not move to non-ban states during the period 
of analysis or vice-versa. 
It is possible that our results are influenced by the fact that firms do not choose their state of 
incorporation randomly. We exclude firms headquartered in Delaware and obtain similar results. 
We also look to see if there is any significant difference in political leaning in ban states versus 
no-ban states to account for the possibility that Democratic-leaning states promote legal bans on 
spending. Our data suggest that ban states are more likely to be Republican-leaning than no-ban 
21 
 
states, but the difference is statistically insignificant. Moreover, ban and no-ban states might differ 
in their industries, and this difference could condition the response of connections to CU. However, 
we find no difference in industry composition across ban and no-ban states.  
We also consider the possibility of confounding bias or omitted correlated variable. Spencer 
and Wood (2014) argue that the level of political competition can create a confounding bias, which 
in our exercise implies that increased political competition may lead to higher independent 
expenditures and political connections. In the online appendix, we tabulate results where the 
models in Table 4 are extended to also control for a Political Competition Index.15 The results are 
qualitatively the same as those in the paper. 
 
C. Changes in Lobbying, PAC and Executive Contributions After CU 
 In Table 5, we examine changes in lobbying expenditures, executive contributions, and PAC 
contributions after CU. Otherwise, the regression specification mimics that of Table 4. Except for 
PAC contributions, lobbying and executive contributions are not restricted to state elections. 
Therefore, we expect no significant change in lobbying and executive contributions in ban versus 
no-ban states from pre- to post-CU periods. Table 5 shows that indeed, the interaction Ban 
State*Post Dummy is insignificant for lobbying expenditures and executive contributions. Further, 
we find that Ban State*Post Dummy is insignificantly related to PAC contributions. The result 
suggests that PAC contributions are not sensitive to the introduction of independent political 
spending as a new mechanism for political activism.  
                                                          
15 The political competition index for state i and year j is 𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑗 = − |
𝐿𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑗+𝑈𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝐿𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑗+𝑈𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑗+𝐿𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑗+𝑈𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑗
− 0.5|, where LHDij 
(LHRij) and UHDij (UHRij) represent the number of seats that Democrats (Republicans) hold, respectively, in the lower 
and upper chambers of the state legislature that was elected in year j. The range of the index is from 0.5 to 0. 
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The Post Dummy is significant and positive for PAC contribution, which replicates the finding 
in Coates (2012) of an increase in PAC contributions after CU. One advantage of our difference-
in-differences exercise over the regression analysis conducted by Coates is that we use the 
heterogeneity on state bans: we can identify the treated firms as those firms in states that had bans 
on independent expenditures prior to CU and use firms in states that had no bans on independent 
expenditures before CU as control firms. This additional source of heterogeneity solves the issue 
of concurrent events that we are unable to control and can confound the causal inference associated 
with CU.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
D. Political Connections by Executives, Board Members, and Others 
We provide evidence consistent with a crowding-out effect of independent political spending 
over political connections. Faccio (2006) shows that political connections by board members are 
very different from those by executives: while the former does not grant a significant advantage to 
the firm, the latter does. In this section, we examine the heterogeneity of this crowding-out effect 
based on the type of political connections.  
BoardEx classifies individuals in the firm into three groups: executives, board members, and 
others. In line with this classification, we define a political connection as Executive Connection if 
the classification of the individual includes CEO, CFO, or COO. We define a political connection 
as Board Connection if the classification of the individual includes independent director, director, 
or independent/deputy chairman. Finally, we define a political connection as Other Connection if 
the job title of the individual includes senior VP, division/regional president, or general manager.  
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Panel A of Table 6 presents the results on announcement returns, and Panel B of Table 6 
presents the results on changes in the number of connections after CU. In the first two columns of 
Panel A, a connection is defined as Executive Connection, in the next two columns connection is 
defined as Board Connection, and in the last two columns, we have Other Connection. We present 
results for both continuous definition of connections and categorical definition of connections and 
use event window (1, +3), though the results are qualitatively the same if we use any of the other 
event windows in Table 2. High Connections is defined by the percentile 90 of connections, which 
varies across types of connections: it is 2 or more for executive connections, 4 or more for board 
connections, and 3 or more for other connections.  
The results show that it is the Board and Other Connections that lose value, though there is 
only mild significance for the value effect of Board Connection (see columns (3) through (6)). In 
contrast, executive connections do not lose value around the announcement of CU, which indicates 
that executive connections maintain their value to the firm and are less substitutable when 
independent expenditures become available after CU. In the last column of Panel A, we find a 
1.14% lower announcement return for firms with a high number of Other Connection relative to 
those with zero Other Connection, which is economically significant. The result shows that Other 
Connection might be the least significant form of connections to the firm, and most substitutable 
when the new avenue of political activism becomes available.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
In Panel B of Table 6, we further test how each type of connection changes after CU. In the 
first two columns of Panel B, a connection is defined as Executive Connection, in the next two 
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columns connection is defined as Board Connection, and in the last two columns, we have Other 
Connection. For each connection type, the first column is for all connections, and the second 
column is for state connections. The results in the table indicate that firms in ban states have fewer 
Other Connection after CU than those in no-ban states. In the last column of Panel B, the 
coefficient of Ban State*Post Dummy is 0.087. The result suggests that firms have 0.087 fewer 
state-level other connections after CU if they headquarter in ban states relative to those firms that 
locate in no-ban states. The estimated coefficient corresponds to an economically sizable effect as 
the average state-level other connection in our sample is 0.501 (i.e., a 17.4% decrease).  
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) show that if a firm’s political connection is established 
through its top officers (CEO, Chairman, etc.), then such a firm is more likely to be bailed out 
during tough times than matching firms. In other words, connections via top executives appear to 
be more effective in their context. Their evidence is consistent with ours that executive connections 
do not lose value around the announcement of CU. 
 
E. Political Sensitivity of Regulated Industries 
In this section, we investigate heterogeneous effects based on whether an industry is regulated 
(i.e., Transportation, Communication and Utilities, with SIC between 4399 and 5001) or non-
regulated (all others).16 The results are shown in Table 7. Regulated industries display a strong 
positive, and significant market reaction (t-stats are above 7). This is consistent with Burns and 
Jindra (2014) who find similar evidence. They argue that regulated industries have greater 
interaction with the government and may benefit more from having more avenues to advance their 
                                                          
16 Results are robust for a different definition of the regulated industry: Regulated Industry Dummy equals one if SIC 
is between 4000 and 5000 and zero otherwise. 
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agendas. In addition to this result, we show that firms with high connections in non-regulated 
industries experience significantly negative announcement returns, whereas connections do not 
affect announcement returns in regulated industries. It suggests that political connections in non-
regulated industries lose value, as they are more substitutable than those in regulated industries. 
This result is consistent with those in Faccio (2006, 2010), who argues that firms in regulated 
industries are more likely to harness the benefits from political and government connections.17 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
 IV. Robustness Tests 
We conduct several robustness tests. First, we look for other confounding, contemporaneous 
information events. The same day that the Supreme Court ruling was announced, President Obama 
publicly endorsed the Volcker rule that commercial banks should not be allowed to engage in 
proprietary trading. 18  Paul Volcker had “campaigned” for the rule during much of 2009, but the 
decision to adopt it may still have come as a surprise to some because of its controversy. While 
our tests include industry dummies to ensure the results are not driven by a particular industry, to 
further minimize this concern, we also drop financial firms (i.e., SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) 
from our sample. The results remain qualitatively similar after excluding financial firms. 
                                                          
17 For completeness, we have repeated the exercise in Table 7 for lobbying, executive contributions, and PAC 
contributions. We find that firms in regulated industries whose executives made contributions to candidates experience 
significantly positive announcement returns whereas executive contributions appear not to affect announcement 
returns in non-regulated industries.  




Second, we investigate whether top customers of the company affect the relationship between 
political activism and firm value. We collect data from Compustat and create the variable 
Government Dummy that equals one if at least one top customer of the firm is government-related 
and zero otherwise. As political connections help obtain government procurement contracts 
(Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2013), we expect a weaker effect if one of the top customers in a firm 
is government-related. Consistent with this, we find that Government Dummy*Connection is 
positively associated with the three-day CAR although the coefficient is insignificant. Government 
Dummy itself is insignificant as well, and our main results still hold. 
Third, we add state-level political competition as a control variable using two measures 
suggested in previous literature: Political Competition Index, described above, and Divided 
Government Dummy. Divided Government Dummy equals one if the state government is divided 
(different parties control different branches of government) and zero if the state government is 
unified.  We wish to control for the possibility that the marginal benefit of political connections 
depends on the state-level political system. For example, after CU, political connections become 
significantly less valuable for firms in states with more political competition between political 
parties. Consistent with this, we find that Political Competition Index*Connection is negatively 
associated with the three-day CAR, but the coefficient is insignificant. Other results remain 
qualitatively the same as before. We also winsorize Connection, Lobbying, Executive 
Contributions, and PAC Contributions, and the results are similar to those reported above.  
Fourth, on June 29th, 2009, the Supreme Court decided that a rehearing was needed so the 
parties could address the question of whether a resolution of the case was tied to, among other 
things, the overruling of Austin vs. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which upheld a state law 
prohibiting an independent political expenditure by the nonprofit Michigan Chamber of 
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Commerce. The rehearing happened on September 9th, 2009. Expanding the scope of the case and 
ordering new oral arguments by the Court is rare and may have provided a signal to expert 
observers that the likely outcome was a ruling in favor of CU. We repeat the stock market 
announcement analysis for each of these dates. We find that Connection is statistically 
insignificant on either date. While there could be many reasons for these results, it is possible that 
a significant amount of uncertainty about the final ruling still remained, which was only truly 
resolved on January 21, 2010. 
Our last robustness checks are placebo tests. We use the three-day CAR from −1 to +1 when 
day 0 is two weeks before/after the date when the CU decision is announced (January 21, 2010). 
We find that Connection, Lobbying, Executive Contributions, and PAC Contributions are all 
statistically insignificant with or without corporate governance control variables. We also 
eliminate the CU effect and examine changes of political connections where the pre-period is 2004-
2006 and the post-period is 2007-2009. The results show that the coefficient associated with the 
Ban State*Post Dummy is insignificant in all specifications. This evidence supports our 
identification strategy of using ban states as the treatment group for an analysis of changes in 
political activism following CU. 
 
 V.   Conclusion 
The paper studies the political activism of publicly traded corporations using the Supreme 
Court ruling on Citizens United vs. FEC for identification. CU promotes a radical change in the 
political activism landscape by allowing corporate treasuries to fund political campaigns directly. 
As it was mostly unanticipated, CU constitutes an exogenous identification shock to 
substitutability across different forms of political activism and allows us to address the quest set 
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by Issacharoff and Karlan (1999) to understand where and why money in politics flows where it 
does.  
We find that political connections lose value, suggesting a crowding-out effect of independent 
political spending over political connections. We confirm this finding by analyzing changes in 
connections at the firm-level using an identification strategy rooted in the fact that, before CU, 
some states had bans on state-level independent political spending. Consistent with the evidence 
on announcement returns, after the ruling, corporations headquartered in ban states have fewer 
state-level political connections relative to corporations in no-ban states. We find that the value of 
lobbying, PAC contributions, and executive contributions was not affected by CU, suggesting that 
these forms of political activism are less substitutable for corporate treasury money. 
Our work focuses on the intensive margin of political activism. It is interesting also to ask 
whether an extensive margin of response can be observed where firms that were politically inactive 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the paper. Connection is the number of 
political connections firms had with government organizations in 2009. State Connection is the number of 
state-level political connections firms had with government organizations in 2009. Lobbying is the natural 
log of the sum of all prior corporate lobbying expenditures till 2009. Executive Contribution is the natural 
log of the total amount of executive contributions. It captures all past contributions made by current 
executives in 2009 and does not include contributions made by past executives. PAC Contribution is the 
natural log of the sum of all prior PAC contributions till 2009. Institutional Ownership is domestic 
institutional ownership. We follow Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and construct G-Index based on 24 
governance provisions provided by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). E-Index is 
proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) and based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments and mergers. We follow Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011) and measure Excesspay as the 
difference between CEO compensation and the median compensation of a set of peer firms in the same 
industry and of similar size as that of the firm. CEO Duality is a binary variable that equals one if the CEO 
held the position of chairman of the board as of December 31, 2009 and zero otherwise. CAR is the three-
day abnormal return from 1 to +1 where day 0 is January 21, 2010 when Citizens United ruling is 
announced. Size is the natural log of the market value of equity (item 25*item 24). BM is the book value of 
equity (item 60) divided by market value of equity (item 25*item 24). Past Return is the past stock return 
for the previous twelve months. ROA is operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6). Debt is 
the Book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by book assets (item 6). Cash is Cash holdings (item 1) 
over book assets (item 6). Sales Growth is the difference between current sales (item 12) and lagged sales, 
all divided by lagged sales.  
 
Variables N Mean 10th Perc. Median 90th Perc. Std. Dev 
Connection 1,722 2.27 0.00 1.00 6.00 3.06 
State Connection 1,722 0.76 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.21 
Lobbying 1,722 5.85 0.00 0.00 15.95 7.16 
Executive Contribution  1,722 8.63 0.00 9.66 12.01 3.60 
PAC Contribution 1,722 3.04 0.00 0.00 11.54 4.95 
Institutional Ownership 1,722 0.67 0.12 0.75 0.94 0.28 
G-Index 1,429 7.42 6.00 7.00 9.00 1.51 
E-Index 1,429 3.68 2.00 4.00 5.00 1.14 
Excesspay 1,722 -0.07 -0.98 0.00 0.79 0.87 
CEO Duality 1,636 0.51 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
CAR 1,722 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.06 0.05 
Size 1,722 7.41 5.53 7.32 9.51 1.60 
BM 1,722 0.64 0.18 0.55 1.18 0.53 
Past Return 1,722 0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.10 0.05 
ROA 1,722 0.02 -0.09 0.03 0.11 0.11 
Debt 1,722 0.22 0.00 0.19 0.48 0.19 
Cash 1,722 0.16 0.01 0.10 0.40 0.16 




Table 2. Political Activism and Firm Value 
This table shows the results from regressing announcement returns on measures of political activism. 
The dependent variable is the percentage CAR measured over different event windows where day 0 is 
January 21, 2010 when CU is announced. In Panel A, Connection is the number of political connections 
firms had with government organizations in 2009. Lobbying is the natural log of the sum of all prior 
corporate lobbying expenditures before the end of 2009. Executive Contribution is the natural log of the 
total amount of executive contribution. It captures all past contributions made by current executives in 
2009. PAC Contribution is the natural log of the sum of all prior PAC contributions before the end of 
2009. In Panel B, High Connection is a dummy variable that equals one if firms have 6 or more political 
connections in 2009 and zero otherwise. Low Connection is a dummy variable that equals one if firms 
have 5 or less (but non-zero) political connections in 2009 and zero otherwise. The complete definitions 
of the control variables can be found in the appendix. We winsorize each control variable at percentiles 
1 and 99. We include industry dummies based on three-digit SIC code and cluster standard errors by 
industry. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Panel A. 
 Announcement Returns 
 (1,+1) (0,+1) (1,+2) (1,+3) 
Connection -0.104 -0.094 -0.107 -0.123 
 [2.83]*** [2.13]** [2.33]*** [2.45]*** 
Lobbying 0.019 0.004 0.019 0.026 
 [0.99] [0.30] [0.97] [1.31] 
Executive 
Contribution 
0.041 0.042 0.031 0.050 
[0.99] [1.07] [0.68] [1.13] 
PAC Contribution -0.027 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 
[1.21] [1.14] [1.00] [0.76] 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.525 0.849 0.744 0.860 
[1.11] [1.91]* [1.54] [1.58] 
Size -0.040 -0.118 0.067 0.171 
 [0.35] [1.36] [0.60] [1.13] 
BM 0.962 0.344 0.892 0.804 
 [1.53] [0.83] [1.25] [0.93] 
Past Return -5.596 -2.105 -8.828 -8.812 
 [1.27] [0.67] [1.65] [1.35] 
ROA 0.490 0.651 0.378 -0.995 
 [0.33] [0.47] [0.26] [0.53] 
Debt 1.422 0.323 2.308 2.626 
 [1.68]* [0.37] [2.42]*** [2.37]*** 
Cash 1.294 0.111 1.414 1.516 
 [1.19] [0.15] [1.23] [1.34] 
Sales Growth -1.671 -1.311 -1.758 -0.951 
 [2.39]*** [2.07]** [2.35]*** [1.05] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.18 






 Announcement Returns 
 (1,+1) (0,+1) (1,+2) (1,+3) 
Low Connection -0.084 -0.130 -0.293 0.146 
 [0.38] [0.55] [1.21] [0.56] 
High Connection -0.895 -0.848 -1.127 -1.078 
 [3.03]*** [2.85]*** [2.88]*** [2.45]*** 
Lobbying 0.016 0.002 0.020 0.022 
 [0.88] [0.16] [1.09] [1.16] 
Executive 
Contribution 
0.038 0.040 0.004 0.045 
[0.92] [1.04] [0.09] [1.01] 
PAC Contribution -0.030 -0.024 -0.019 -0.026 
 [1.35] [1.27] [0.72] [0.94] 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.487 0.827 1.155 0.757 
[1.06] [1.90]* [2.12]** [1.42] 
Size -0.060 -0.135 0.053 0.156 
 [0.47] [1.62] [0.35] [0.96] 
BM 0.926 0.311 1.029 0.775 
 [1.51] [0.78] [1.39] [0.91] 
Past Return -5.647 -2.143 -11.775 -8.913 
 [1.29] [0.68] [2.05]** [1.37] 
ROA 0.551 0.701 0.459 -0.914 
 [0.37] [0.51] [0.27] [0.49] 
Debt 1.396 0.293 2.689 2.635 
 [1.66]* [0.34] [2.50]*** [2.37]*** 
Cash 1.268 0.085 1.920 1.490 
 [1.16] [0.11] [1.63] [1.31] 
Sales Growth -1.681 -1.327 -1.802 -0.963 
 [2.40]*** [2.08]** [1.83]* [1.06] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.19 0.17 0.18 









Table 3. Political Activism and Firm Value with Corporate Governance Controls 
This table shows the results from regressing announcement returns on measures of political activism, controlling for 
corporate governance variables. The dependent variable is the percentage CAR measured over the window (1, +3), 
where day 0 is January 21, 2010 when CU is announced. Political activism variables are as in Table 2. We follow Larcker, 
Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011) and measure Excesspay as the difference between CEO compensation and the median 
compensation of a set of peer firms in the same industry and of similar size as that of the firm. E-Index is proposed by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) and based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments and mergers. We 
follow Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and construct G-Index based on 24 governance provisions provided by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). CEO Duality is a binary variable that equals one if the CEO held the 
position of chairman of the board as of December 31, 2009 and zero otherwise. The complete definitions of the control 
variables can be found in the appendix. We winsorize each control variable at percentiles 1 and 99. We include industry 
dummies based on three-digit SIC code and cluster standard errors by industry. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance level, respectively. 
 Announcement Returns over (-1,+3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connection -0.124 -0.150 -0.147 -0.132 
 [2.43]*** [3.23]*** [3.25]*** [2.54]*** 
Lobbying 0.025 0.014 0.014 0.019 
 [1.30] [0.67] [0.67] [0.96] 
Executive 
Contribution 
0.050 0.051 0.050 0.065 
[1.14] [0.88] [0.87] [1.36] 
PAC Contribution -0.021 -0.042 -0.042 -0.019 
 [0.75] [1.53] [1.53] [0.67] 
Excesspay -0.039    
 [0.26]    
E-Index  0.174   
  [1.01]   
G-Index   0.140  
   [0.96]  
CEO Duality    -0.027 
    [0.07] 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.874 0.693 0.700 -0.096 
[1.62] [1.21] [1.21] [0.15] 
Size 0.173 0.347 0.351 0.120 
 [1.15] [3.15]*** [3.20]*** [0.75] 
BM 0.808 1.837 1.829 0.682 
 [0.93] [1.56] [1.57] [0.74] 
Past Return -8.747 -15.963 -15.811 -9.400 
 [1.33] [2.73]*** [2.75]*** [1.55] 
ROA -1.001 -0.502 -0.530 -2.359 
 [0.53] [0.36] [0.38] [1.30] 
Debt 2.652 0.854 0.896 2.582 
 [2.36]*** [1.07] [1.12] [2.16]** 
Cash 1.509 -0.656 -0.586 1.343 
 [1.34] [0.47] [0.42] [1.14] 
Sales Growth -0.933 0.150 0.192 -0.969 
 [1.04] [0.16] [0.21] [1.08] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 





Table 4. Changes of Political Connections after CU 
This table shows how political connections changed with CU using OLS regressions. The dependent variable 
in column (1) is the number of political connections firms had with all government organizations. From 
columns (2) to (4), the dependent variable is the number of connections established with the government of 
national-, state- and local-level, respectively. Ban State is a binary variable that equals one if the firm is 
headquartered in a state that had bans on independent expenditures on state elections and zero otherwise. Post 
Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one from 2010 to 2012 and zero from 2007 to 2009. Lobbying is the 
natural log of the amount of corporate lobbying expenditures. Executive Contribution is the natural log of the 
amount of executive contributions. PAC Contribution is the natural log of the amount of PAC contributions. 
The complete definitions of the control variables can be found in the appendix. We winsorize each control 
variable at percentiles 1 and 99. We include time and three-digit SIC industry dummy variables. Standard 
errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 All National State Local 
Ban State -0.273 -0.204 -0.115 0.045 
 [2.17]** [2.03]** [1.78]* [2.08]** 
Post Dummy 0.534 0.190 0.281 0.063 
 [6.08]*** [3.10]*** [7.64]*** [4.55]*** 
Ban State*Post 
Dummy 
-0.178 -0.070 -0.099 -0.009 
[2.12]** [1.22] [3.14]*** [0.67] 
Lobbying 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.97] [0.92] [1.08] [0.92] 
Executive 
Contribution 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[2.18]** [2.26]** [1.76]* [1.02] 
PAC Contribution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [1.32] [0.99] [1.70]* [1.95]* 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-0.951 -0.611 -0.258 -0.082 
[3.18]*** [3.28]*** [1.85]* [2.47]*** 
Investment 0.637 -0.022 0.656 0.003 
 [0.37] [0.02] [0.86] [0.02] 
Leverage 0.802 0.505 0.311 -0.014 
 [1.97]** [1.85]* [1.62] [0.28] 
Size 1.085 0.780 0.260 0.045 
 [9.35]*** [8.75]*** [6.38]*** [6.04]*** 
ROA -2.207 -1.721 -0.424 -0.062 
 [2.77]*** [2.87]*** [1.70]* [0.66] 
BM 1.025 0.685 0.286 0.054 
 [4.36]*** [4.33]*** [3.20]*** [2.60]*** 
Cash -0.152 -0.054 -0.011 -0.087 
 [0.31] [0.15] [0.06] [1.41] 
Sales Growth -0.702 -0.499 -0.174 -0.029 
 [4.64]*** [4.24]*** [3.96]*** [1.65]* 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.50 0.46 0.34 0.20 





Table 5. Changes of Lobbying, Executive Contribution, and PAC Contribution after CU 
This table shows how lobbying, executive contributions, and PAC contributions changed with CU using OLS regressions. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is the natural log of corporate lobbying expenditures. The dependent variable in 
column (2) is the natural log of political contributions made by current executives. The dependent variable in column (3) 
is the natural log of PAC contributions. Ban State is a binary variable that equals one if the headquarter of the firm locates 
in the state that had bans on independent expenditures on state elections and zero otherwise. Post Dummy is a dummy 
variable that equals one from 2010 to 2012 and zero from 2007 to 2009. Connection is the number of political connections 
firms had with government organizations. Lobbying is the natural log of the amount of corporate lobbying expenditures. 
Executive Contribution is the natural log of the amount of executive contributions. PAC Contribution is the natural log 
of the amount of PAC contributions. The complete definitions of the control variables can be found in the appendix. We 
winsorize each control variable at percentiles 1 and 99. We include time and three-digit SIC industry dummy variables. 
Standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 Lobbying Executive Contribution PAC Contribution 
Ban State 0.415 0.023 -0.321 
 [1.66]* [0.19] [1.49] 
Post Dummy 0.459 -1.251 0.191 
 [2.59]*** [7.48]*** [1.65]* 
Ban State*Post Dummy 0.158 -0.117 0.122 
 [0.88] [0.63] [1.17] 
Connection 0.156 0.071 0.192 
 [3.02]*** [3.73]*** [3.94]*** 
Lobbying  0.057 0.106 
  [4.23]*** [8.53]*** 
Executive Contribution 0.135  0.064 
 [5.43]***  [5.18]*** 
PAC Contribution 0.308 0.067  
 [9.86]*** [4.30]***  
Institutional Ownership -0.614 -0.773 -0.826 
 [1.34] [2.23]** [3.01]*** 
Leverage 2.503 1.553 -0.107 
 [4.23]*** [3.89]*** [0.25] 
Size 1.310 0.552 0.477 
 [12.82]*** [7.78]*** [6.64]*** 
Cash 2.138 -0.878 -1.254 
 [3.44]*** [1.74]* [3.52]*** 
ROA 1.438 0.683 0.292 
 [1.07] [0.64] [0.38] 
Tobin’s Q -0.319 -0.045 -0.197 
 [3.02]*** [0.54] [3.24]*** 
Sales Growth -0.388 -0.168 -0.386 
 [1.48] [0.84] [3.04]*** 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.32 0.45 





Table 6. Different Categories of Political Connections 
Panel A presents results on announcement returns, and Panel B presents results on changes in the number of 
connections after CU. In columns (1) and (2) of Panel A, connections are defined as Executive Connection where 
the connected individual is a top executive, e.g., a CEO, CFO, or COO. In columns (3) and (4) of Panel A, 
connection are defined as Board Connection where the connected individual is a board member, e.g., an 
independent director, director, or independent/deputy chairman. In columns (5) and (6) of Panel A, connections are 
defined as Other Connection where the connected individual is a senior VP, division/regional president, general 
manager, etc. High Connection is defined by the percentile 90, which varies across types of connections: it is 2 or 
more for executive connections, 4 or more for board connections, and 3 or more for other connections. In Panel A, 
the dependent variable is expressed as the percentage CAR measured over the event window (1, +3) where day 0 
is January 21, 2010 when CU is announced. In column 1 (2) of Panel B, the dependent variable is the number of all 
(state-level) executive connections from 2007 to 2012. In column 3 (4) of Panel B, the dependent variable is the 
number of all (state-level) board connections and in column 5 (6) of Panel B, the dependent variable is the number 
of all (state-level) other connections. The complete definitions of the control variables can be found in the appendix. 
Standard errors are clustered by industry (state) in Panel A (B). ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively.  
Panel A. Announcement Returns 
 Announcement Returns over (-1,+3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Connection -0.066  -0.134  -0.158  
 [0.24]  [1.82]*  [2.69]***  
Low 
Connection 
 0.163  0.303  0.542 
 [0.49]  [0.78]  [1.07] 
High 
Connection 
 -1.140  -0.670  -1.142 
 [1.17]  [1.77]*  [2.83]*** 
Lobbying 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.024 0.023 
 [1.12] [1.14] [1.19] [1.11] [1.21] [1.20] 
Executive 
Contribution 
0.044 0.045 0.047 0.044 0.046 0.047 
[1.00] [1.03] [1.08] [1.00] [1.04] [1.07] 
PAC 
Contribution 
-0.030 -0.032 -0.026 -0.028 -0.022 -0.027 
[1.10] [1.17] [0.96] [1.07] [0.83] [1.07] 
IO 0.827 0.824 0.858 0.799 0.808 0.793 
 [1.51] [1.51] [1.58] [1.47] [1.49] [1.47] 
Size 0.074 0.073 0.118 0.108 0.165 0.147 
 [0.45] [0.44] [0.74] [0.65] [1.07] [0.77] 
BM 0.721 0.728 0.748 0.746 0.808 0.748 
 [0.85] [0.86] [0.88] [0.88] [0.92] [0.89] 
Past Return -8.870 -8.758 -9.048 -8.888 -8.592 -8.862 
 [1.34] [1.32] [1.36] [1.36] [1.33] [1.35] 
ROA -0.826 -0.830 -0.919 -0.845 -0.978 -0.935 
 [0.43] [0.44] [0.49] [0.45] [0.52] [0.49] 
Debt 2.558 2.496 2.572 2.528 2.638 2.543 
 [2.28]** [2.22]** [2.30]** [2.25]** [2.38]*** [2.31]** 
Cash 1.509 1.473 1.430 1.472 1.609 1.467 
 [1.33] [1.30] [1.27] [1.31] [1.40] [1.32] 
Sales 
Growth 
-0.827 -0.879 -0.883 -0.903 -0.881 -0.966 
[0.89] [0.96] [0.96] [0.98] [0.97] [1.06] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 




Panel B. Changes in the Number of Connections after CU 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ban State -0.055 -0.021 -0.022 -0.031 -0.212 -0.134 
 [2.66]*** [1.32] [0.28] [0.66] [2.14]** [2.39]*** 
Post Dummy -0.001 0.006 0.017 0.029 0.234 0.142 
 [0.04] [0.62] [0.44] [1.36] [3.48]*** [3.32]*** 
Ban State*Post 
Dummy 
0.019 0.002 -0.047 -0.033 -0.132 -0.087 
[1.70]* [0.34] [1.28] [1.32] [2.28]** [2.68]*** 
Lobbying -0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.029 0.016 
 [0.96] [0.71] [2.13]** [0.27] [3.88]*** [3.55]*** 
Executive 
Contribution 
0.009 0.001 0.017 0.011 0.005 -0.002 
[5.84]*** [1.43] [2.78]*** [2.56]*** [0.93] [0.69] 
PAC Contribution 
0.008 0.004 0.048 0.021 0.088 0.043 
[2.11]** [3.43]*** [4.11]*** [3.09]*** [3.91]*** [3.49]*** 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-0.108 0.006 -0.354 0.012 -0.518 -0.276 
[2.49]*** [0.24] [3.10]*** [0.13] [2.32]** [2.10]** 
Investment -0.307 0.042 -0.096 -0.500 1.776 1.109 
 [1.38] [0.31] [0.09] [0.84] [2.11]** [1.82]* 
Leverage 0.071 0.049 -0.039 -0.191 0.580 0.500 
 [1.16] [1.57] [0.17] [1.34] [1.58] [2.05]** 
Size 0.047 -0.000 0.394 0.123 0.610 0.267 
 [6.55]*** [0.09] [9.39]*** [5.14]*** [5.43]*** [4.22]*** 
ROA -0.019 0.009 -1.121 -0.171 -1.549 -0.652 
 [0.24] [0.15] [3.02]*** [0.94] [2.47]*** [2.26]** 
BM 0.010 -0.007 0.234 0.058 0.721 0.318 
 [0.43] [0.60] [3.18]*** [0.91] [3.07]*** [2.36]*** 
Cash 0.012 0.008 -0.552 -0.369 0.708 0.516 
 [0.28] [0.31] [2.70]*** [3.27]*** [1.87]* [2.49]*** 
Sales Growth -0.030 -0.016 -0.314 -0.119 -0.202 -0.088 
 [1.82]* [1.48] [4.49]*** [2.84]*** [1.72]* [1.19] 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.17 0.42 0.31 0.41 0.34 





Table 7. Political Activism and Firm Value: Regulated vs. Non-Regulated Industries 
This table shows the results from regressing announcement returns on measures of political activism for 
regulated and non-regulated industries. The dependent variable is expressed as the percentage CAR measured 
over different event windows where day 0 is January 21, 2010 when CU is announced. Regulated is a dummy 
variable that equals one if SIC is between 4399 and 5001 and zero otherwise. Political activism variables are 
as in Table 2. The complete definitions of the control variables can be found in the appendix. We winsorize 
each control variable at percentiles 1 and 99. We include industry dummies based on three-digit SIC code and 
cluster standard errors by industry. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, 
respectively. 
 Announcement Returns 
 (1,+1) (0,+1) (1,+2) (1,+3) 
Regulated 2.648 3.378 4.851 2.700 
 [7.71]*** [13.41]*** [14.10]*** [6.77]*** 
Connection* 
Regulated 
0.034 0.034 0.023 0.045 
[0.41] [0.63] [0.30] [0.50] 
Connection* 
Non-Regulated 
-0.128 -0.116 -0.129 -0.152 
[3.22]*** [2.45]*** [2.60]*** [2.81]*** 
Lobbying 0.020 0.005 0.020 0.027 
 [1.04] [0.38] [1.02] [1.37] 
Executive 
Contribution 
0.040 0.042 0.030 0.050 
[0.98] [1.06] [0.67] [1.12] 
PAC Contribution -0.026 -0.020 -0.021 -0.019 
 [1.16] [1.08] [0.95] [0.71] 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.524 0.848 0.743 0.858 
[1.11] [1.92]* [1.55] [1.59] 
Size -0.035 -0.113 0.072 0.177 
 [0.30] [1.31] [0.65] [1.18] 
BM 0.968 0.350 0.898 0.812 
 [1.54] [0.85] [1.26] [0.94] 
Past Return -5.577 -2.087 -8.810 -8.788 
 [1.27] [0.66] [1.64] [1.35] 
ROA 0.513 0.673 0.400 -0.966 
 [0.34] [0.49] [0.28] [0.51] 
Debt 1.506 0.401 2.387 2.728 
 [1.77]* [0.47] [2.49]*** [2.46]*** 
Cash 1.329 0.144 1.447 1.559 
 [1.21] [0.19] [1.25] [1.37] 
Sales Growth -1.685 -1.325 -1.772 -0.969 
 [2.42]*** [2.09]** [2.37]*** [1.07] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.18 
N 1,722 1,722 1,722 1,722 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Measures of Political Activism 
Connection The number of political connections firms had with 
government organizations at national, state, or local levels. 
We count it as one political connection if an individual with 
a political background currently holds a position in the firm 
(as an executive or board member). We first collect raw 
data (125,797 observations) from the BoardEx database. 
We drop observations if the start and end date for 
government or firm positions held by individuals are 
missing. We also delete observations if individuals leave 
the firm before joining the government. 60,294 
observations remain after these criteria. The position each 
holds in a firm varies each year (20,656 firm-individual 
observations). For individuals with no more than two 
observations, we create the earliest start/end year and the 
latest start/end year for each individual to verify the 
duration of an individual’s stay in the firm. For individuals 
that have three or more observations (1,839 firm-individual 
matches), we manually check to identify whether the 
individual holds a position each year. We then create the 
number of political connections for each firm-year by 
aggregating the number of connected individuals in the 
same firm. 
Source: BoardEx database 
 
Lobbying For the event study analysis, we add up for each firm all 
past lobbying expenditures made before 2009 to calculate 
cumulative prior lobbying expenditures (Lobbying). 
Lobbying is the natural log of the sum of all previous 
corporate lobbying expenditures before the end of 2009. 
We also use lobbying expenditures in 2009 as an alternative 
variable with similar results. In the diff-in-diff analysis, we 
use each firm’s current value of lobbying expenditures for 
each year from 2007 to 2012. Lobbying data are available 
on https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/. 





Executive Contribution For the event study analysis, we measure executives’ 
political contributions at a firm in 2009 (Executive 
Contribution) by adding all past contributions made before 
the end of 2009 by current executives independently of their 
previous occupation. We also sum up contributions made 
by both current and past executives provided the 
contributions are made during the tenure as a top executive 
of the firm, and results are similar. For the diff-in-diff 
analysis, we use the current value of executive 
contributions for each firm and year from 2007 to 2012. 
Individual political contributions data are collected from 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and matched to 
ExecuComp names. In the end, 82% of matched results are 
based on employer names rather than zip codes. We also 
check the occupation of matched donors. The FEC records 
occupation since 2001 and the coverage has improved over 
time. In 2010, 80% of the matched donors have recorded 
occupation of ‘executive’, ‘director’, ‘CEO’, etc.   
Source: ExecuComp & FEC 
 
PAC  Contribution For the event study analysis, PAC Contribution for each 
firm in 2009 is the natural log of the sum of all prior 
political contributions donated from corporate Political 
Action Committees (PACs) to state elections before the end 
of 2009. For the diff-in-diff analysis, we use the current 
value of PAC contributions for each firm and year from 
2007 to 2012. PAC contributions data are available on 
http://www.followthemoney.org/.  
Source: Follow The Money 
 
Panel B: Corporate Governance 
G-Index An equally-weighted index based on 24 governance 
provisions provided by the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 
2003). IRRC covers between 1400 and 1800 firms 
depending on the year. All S&P 500 firms are covered in 
IRRC. High G-Index indicates weak corporate governance. 
Source: IRRC & RiskMetrics Database 
 
E-Index An entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered 
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison 
pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements 
for charter amendments and mergers (Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
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Ferrell, 2009). High E-Index indicates weak corporate 
governance. 
Source: RiskMetrics Database 
 
Excesspay The difference between CEO compensation and the median 
compensation of a set of peer firms of the same industry 
and similar size as that of the firm (Larcker, Ormazabal, and 
Taylor, 2011). More specifically, it is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of total compensation (variable TDC1 
from ExecuComp) for the CEO less the natural logarithm 
of the median total annual pay for all remaining firms on 
ExecuComp that are in the same Fama and French (1997) 
12 industry group and size quintile of the firm for the same 
year. High Excesspay indicates weak corporate governance. 
Source: ExecuComp 
 
CEO Duality A binary variable that equals one if the CEO held the 
position of chairman of the board as of the end of each year 
and zero otherwise. If CEO Duality equals one, it indicates 
weak corporate governance. 
Source: RiskMetrics Database 
 
Panel C: Financial Control Variables 




BM The book value of equity (item 60) divided by market value 
of equity (item 25*item 24). 
Source: Compustat 
 
Past Return The past stock return for the previous twelve months. 
Source: Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
files 
 
ROA Ratio of operating income (item 13) to book assets (item 6). 
Source: Compustat 
 
Debt Book value of debt (item 9 + item 34) divided by book 





Cash Cash holdings (item 1) over book assets (item 6). 
Source: Compustat 
 
Leverage Book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of 
book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of 
equity (item 25* item 24). 
Source: Compustat 
 
Tobin’s Q The book value of assets (item 6) minus book value of 
equity (item144) plus the market value of equity (item 25* 
item 24), all divided by book value of assets (item 6). 
Source: Compustat 
 
Sales Growth The difference between current sales (item 12) and lagged 
sales, all divided by lagged sales.  
Source: Compustat 
 




Institutional Ownership The sum of the holdings of all institutions domiciled in the 
US where the stock is listed divided by the firm’s market 
capitalization.  
Source: FactSet/LionShares Database  
 
 
